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This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries, and their
impact of public finances since the mid-1980s. It presents a new data set on institutional reforms and
their impact in Europe. Empirical pattern confirm our prediction that more stringent fiscal rules exist
under large coalition governments, while the centralisation of budgetary procedures is the main form of
fiscal governance elsewhere. In addition, the centralisation of procedures does not restrain public debt
in countries more prone to a rules-based approach, whereas more stringent fiscal rules seem to support
fiscal discipline in almost all EU countries.
Keywords: public indebtedness, budgetary procedures, fiscal rules, European public finances
JEL classification: H11, H61, H62
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In Europe and elsewhere, the past two decades have seen a strong and growing interest in fiscal
policy rules aimed at containing public sector deficits and reducing public sector debts.
Importantly, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact establish a European
fiscal framework with the objective to enforce fiscal sustainability and the stabilising role of
public finances in EU member states. However, while all EU member states face the same
European policy framework, the application of fiscal rules and multi-annual targets varies
considerably at the national level. This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and
budget procedures in EU countries, and their impact of public finances since the mid-1980s.
Two alternative approaches to overcome the deficit bias inherent in fragmented budgetary
decision-making can be distinguished: the contract and delegation approach. While the
delegation approach mainly rests on the delegation of power to the minister of finance to
overcome the coordination problem inherent in budgetary decision making, the contract
approach hinges on pre-established budgetary targets and rules. These forms of fiscal
governance differ in their functionality for the prevailing type of government in EU member
states. The delegation approach is more suited for single party majority governments, usually
present in majoritarian electoral systems, whereas the contract approach is more functional to
the type of coalition governments that emerge regularly in highly proportional electoral
systems.
In the present study we update and extend previous research on budgetary processes in
European countries. When looking at the institutional development in Stage II and III of EMU,
the main finding is that overall budgetary processes are more centralised now than they were in
the early 1990s. At the onset of Stage II several countries still showed rather fragmented
decision-making structures giving rise to a budgetary co-ordination problem. By comparison,
spending and deficit biases should be less prevailing in budgetary decision-making now than
they were a decade ago in several highly indebted countries. Second, institutional reforms are
in line with our functional considerations relating the structure of government to the type of
fiscal governance. Thus, the overall current pattern of budgetary institutions confirms that
electoral systems leading regularly to majority government and persistent party constellations
in government tend to follow a delegation approach of institutional centralisation to overcome
the fiscal co-ordination problem. A mixed approach tends to emerge in states with minority
governments. These institutional developments can be understood as instances of institutional
choice yielding a functional form of governance. Our analysis thus links constitutional
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countries with predominantly coalition governments employ the contract approach whileregulations – such as electoral rules producing specific forms of governance – to more detailed
decision-making structures.
As regards the budgetary impact of these fiscal rules and forms of governance, econometric
evidence indicates that the effectiveness of centralising budgetary decision-making varies with
the form of fiscal governance. It contributes less to fiscal sustainability for the contract
approach, where the stringency of multi-annual targets seems to be more important. For
delegation states, the centralisation of the budget process as well as more stringent budgetary
targets seem to operate as disciplining devices. Various reasons can drive this result. From a
theoretical point of view, the impact of multi-annual targets should be contingent on being
backed by a strong minister of finance. Unfortunately, the empirical results do not allow us to
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December 2004I. Introduction
In Europe and elsewhere, the past two decades have seen a strong and growing interest in fiscal
policy rules aimed at containing public sector deficits and reducing public sector debts. Policy
rules specify numerical targets for annual government deficits, debts, or spending. Such rules
have a venerable history at the sub-national level and some countries have used less specific
ones – such as the ‘golden rule’ - at the national level for a long time. What is new is the
application of specific annual targets at the national level. The Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact establish a European fiscal framework with the objective to enforce
fiscal sustainability and the stabilising role of public finances in EU member states. The
framework is based on fiscal rules, expressed as deficit and debt limits in the Treaty and the
requirement to maintain a close to balance or in surplus position in the medium term in the
Stability and Growth Pact. The surveillance procedure elaborated to enforce compliance with
these rules is largely based on the announcement of multi-annual budgetary targets being
monitored at the international level. The interest in fiscal rules in Europe and elsewhere is a
reaction to the experience of rapidly rising debt levels and unsustainable deficits in the 1970s
and 1980s. But while rules seem attractive and straightforward to contain the spending and
borrowing bias of profligate governments, it is by no means clear what institutional design
these rules and multi-annual budgetary targets need to be effective. This area is the main focus
of our study, where we analyse the choice of budgetary rules and procedures at the national
level and their impact on the sustainability of public finances.
While all EU member states face the same European policy framework, the application of
fiscal rules and multi-annual targets varies considerably in fact at the national level. Hallerberg
and von Hagen (1999) show that there are alternative approaches to overcome the common
pool problem inherent in fragmented budgetary decision-making. The two approaches
resemble some characteristics of the ‘rules vs. discretion’ alternative known from the monetary
policy literature. For fiscal policy the two types of governance are the contract and delegation
approach respectively. While the delegation approach mainly rests on the delegation of power
to the minister of finance to overcome the coordination problem inherent in budgetary decision
making, the contract approach hinges on pre-established budgetary targets and rules. Therefore,
the contract approach seems to be much more compatible with the European fiscal framework
than delegation states, since their budgets are based on the multi-annual target setting requested
by the European fiscal framework. These forms of fiscal governance differ in their
functionality for the prevailing type of government in EU member states. The delegation
approach is more suited for single party majority governments, usually present in majoritarian
7
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governments that emerge regularly in highly proportional electoral systems. Therefore they are
not easily interchangeable or adaptable to a rules-based setting.
Beyond the work of von Hagen and coauthors1 there is little research on the choice of the form
of fiscal governance. The theoretical political economy literature concerned with institutional
issues mainly focuses on specific decision-making prerogatives as a solution to a spending and
deficit bias.2  However, little is done on the institutional choice as such,3 and given the
restrictions on data availability empirical research also remains fairly limited.4 Our paper
provides new evidence based on a survey conducted in 2001 (Hallerberg et al. 2001). It
describes the current budgetary institutions and their evolution over the past decade. The
detailed institutional analysis shows that the choice of budgetary processes and national fiscal
targets and rules corresponds to our predictions. Whereas contract states tended to tighten the
stringency of their fiscal rules, delegation states moved towards more centralised decision-
making procedures.
Having established the main pattern of institutional choice, we explore the policy effect of
these institutions, with respect to the main objectives of the European fiscal framework. Our
empirical result confirms theoretical predictions. Delegation in budget procedures and more
stringent fiscal rules contribute to fiscal discipline. However, more stringent fiscal targets seem
to work largely across EU 15 countries, whereas delegation is only effective in delegation
states. Thus, the delegation and the contract approach provide effective instruments to
overcome the deficit bias associated with the coordination problem of public finances if
employed in accordance with the existing government structure. This falls in line with much of
the empirical literature on budgetary processes.5
The following section presents the theoretical background. The common pool resource problem
and forms of governance as possible solution mechanisms are explained. Moreover, we derive
predictions on the choice of forms of governance based on the structure of the electoral system
and dominant type of government. Section 3 provides the empirical evidence on government
structures. Section 4 and 5 explains which budgetary institution determine the stringency of
                                                     
1  von Hagen (1992), von Hagen and Harden (1994), Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999)
2  See Alesina and Perotti (1999) and von Hagen (2000) for an overview.
3  The closest to the argument developed in this paper is actually the principal agent approach applied to US
trade policy (see Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). The authors consider the
willingness of Congress to delegate special discretionary authority to the President as consequence of a unified
or divided government constellation.
4  For an exception see de Haan et al. (1999) who partly updated the information collected by von Hagen (1992).
5  See the contributions in Poterba and von Hagen (1999) as well as Strauch and von Hagen (2000) for an
overview of the empirical literature on this topic.
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institutions developed in EU member states. Section 6 presents the empirical evidence on the
impact of budgetary institutions on public indebtedness.
II. Theory – Forms of Governance and their Choice
II.1. Forms of Fiscal Governance
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature suggests that the institutions governing
the budget process are important determinants of a country’s fiscal performance (von Hagen
1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1994b; see also the international contributions in Poterba and
von Hagen, 1999, and von Hagen and Strauch, 2000; see also Buti and Sapir, 1998). Budgeting
its passage through the legislature, and its implementation. These rules distribute strategic
influence among the participants in the budget process and regulate the flow of information. In
doing so, they have important effects of the outcomes of budgeting processes.
The starting point of the institutional approach to public budgeting is to recognize the
externality resulting from the fact that government spending is commonly targeted at specific
groups in society while being financed from a general tax fund to which all tax-payers
contribute. The resulting incongruence between those who pay for and those who benefit from
individual public policies implies that individuals bidding for the funding of such policies tend
to recognize their full benefit but only a part of their social cost, as the costs are spread out
more widely over the entire society. In such situations, common to all modern democracies,
policymakers engage in excessive spending, since the constituencies they represent and who
benefit from the public policy programs they bid for do not bear the full costs of these
programs. Putting the argument into a dynamic context, one can show that the externality
problem results in excessive deficits and debts (Velasco, 1999).
In the American form of the argument, politicians representing individual electoral districts use
the federal budget process to direct money taken out of the national general tax fund to public
policy projects benefiting their electoral districts. The difference between the spatial incidence
of the costs and benefits of these projects creates a tendency to overestimate the net marginal
benefit from spending. As a result, federal government spending grows too large. Applying this
in society rather than regions or electoral districts requires a translation of the geographical
dimension into one of different constituencies in society. Still, politicians representing different
9
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paradigm to a European political context, where politicians often represent countrywide groups
December 2004groups in society spend money taken out of a general tax fund on programs aimed at different
groups in society.
6
The core of the argument then is that public budgeting involves a co-ordination failure among
the relevant decision makers. The argument suggests that the tendency to spend more and to
run large deficits increases with the number of representatives of individual spending interests
that are allowed to make autonomous spending decisions, i.e., the more fragmented the budget
process is. Since the most important representatives of individual spending interests in
European governments are the individual spending ministers, an implication of this proposition
is that government spending and deficits grow with the number of spending departments and
ministers in a country’s government. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) confirm this proposition
empirically for OECD countries.
Interpreting the problem of excessive spending and deficits as a co-ordination failure leads one
importance of decision-making rules that promote a comprehensive view of the externality
problem, i.e., one that takes the full benefits and costs of the costs and benefits of all public
policy projects. The solution to fragmentation is thus centralization of the budget process, the
creation of institutions forcing the participants in the budget process to recognize the true
marginal cost and benefit of the projects financed from the general tax fund, and thus to
internalize the budgeting externality.
There are two basic institutional approaches to achieve the necessary coordination overcoming
the CPR problem are the delegation approach and the contracts approach (Hallerberg and von
decision-maker who is less bount to special interests than ministers heading spending
departments. Typically this is the minister of finance. The delegation approach builds on a
strong agenda-setting power of the finance minister during the initial budget planning stage.
Then the subsequent approval stage must be sufficiently restrictive to avoid major changes to
the budget proposal. In the final implementation stage, a finance minister vested with strong
monitoring capacity in the implementation of the budget and the power to correct deviations
from the budget plan. Under the contract approach, the coalition parties start the budget process
by negotiating and agreeing on a set of key budgetary parameters. Participants in these
negotiations are party leaders, who may be but need not to be cabinet members. Here, it is the
                                                     
6 Italy’s experience with growing welfare payments is a prime example for this mechanism. In the past 30 years,




Working Paper Series No. 419
to look at similar problems in practice for solutions. Political economy emphasizes the
December 2004
Hagen, 1999). The former emphasises the delegation of significant strategic powers to aprocess of negotiation that makes the participants realise the externalities created by the
general tax fund.
7 These targets ideally should be considered as binding, and the minister of
finance should mainly have the function of monitoring and enforcing their implementation, but
little discretionary power. Compliance of the government itself with these targets is checked by
a strong monitoring capacity of the parliament, which also should have the authority to correct
the governmental budget proposal during the approval stage.
II.2. The Choice of the Form of Fiscal Governance and its Implications
The existence of two institutional approaches, delegation and contracts, obviously raises the
question which one is the appropriate approach to solving the externality problem of the budget
process for a given country. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) show that the two approaches
are suited for different types of governments. Delegation is the proper approach for single-
party governments or governments where coalition partners are close to one another
ideologically and run together in elections, while the contract approach is better suited for
multi-party coalition governments. In a nutshell, it is difficult for a coalition government to
work under a strong finance minister, since the latter necessarily comes from one of the
coalition parties. Vesting him with special authorities raises concerns among the other parties
about a fair treatment of their spending preferences in the budget process. The principal agent
problem emerging in coalition governments is certainly increasing in the ideological dispersion
of the government and the degree of competition in the process of coalition formation. The
obstacles to delegation are high when political preferences in a governing coalition are highly
dispersed or the process of government formation is competitive, with frequently changing
coalition partners even if fractions of the previous coalition stay in power, after the election a
new governing coalition possibly will be formed. At the same time, a commitment to fiscal
targets is harder to keep for a single-party government, since there is no effective threat against
reneging on the targets. Enforcement of budget targets under the delegation approach
ultimately relies on the ability of the head of the executive to remove recalcitrant spending
ministers from office. This power may exist in single-party governments, where the hierarchy
in cabinet conforms to the hierarchy of party power structures. It may also exist in governments
where coalition partners cannot continue in power without each other, such as is common in
usually exist in coalition governments where alternative coalitions of existing parties are
evident and where parties traditionally run against each other in elections in any event.
                                                     
7 See von Hagen and Harden (1996) for a formal discussion of the two approaches.
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France and in Germany and for an extended period of time in Austria.  But this power does notBy comparison, the incentive to negotiate a fiscal contract or release a fiscal rule at the start of
a government is much larger for coalition governments. Renegotiating the fiscal policy stance
for each budget may be costly, particularly if the ideological constellation within the
government is rather complex. Continued budgetary struggle distracts from the operational
functions of the government and may hamper the effective implementation of policies.
Moreover, so long as there are alternative possible coalition partners in the opposition, the
threat to break up the coalition is a very effective one for enforcing negotiated budget targets in
ideologically dispersed multi-party governments. This reasoning suggests that the contract
approach is the more appropriate one for countries where governments are typically formed by
coalitions of different parties.
The previous two types of governance referred to majority governments only. A mixed form of
governance seems to fit most for minority governments, which are commonplace in
Scandinavia. Since one party usually forms the government or is at the core of the governing
coalition, the delegation approach is best suited for the budgetary planning stage. With regard
to the parliamentary phase, however, the contract approach applies since the parties lending
support to the governmental proposal may want to be assured in advance that their wishes are
sufficiently heard. Therefore they are likely to insist upon strong parliamentary control of the
government and fix budgetary targets in laws, since formal coalition agreements are not
written. How this approach works in practice may, however, strongly depends on the party
constellation in parliament. If the supporting parties have no alternative, it may resemble more
the characteristics of a single party government operating under an delegation approach, while
it comes probably closer to a contract approach when supporting parties credibly can threaten
to support a different party able to form a minority government.
III. Electoral Systems and Party Constellations in Government in European Countries
Electoral institutions strongly influence the likelihood of one party wining a majority of
legislative seats and consequently having the ability to form a one-party majority government.
One important factor is the number of parties that win seats in parliament.   If there are a few
parties, there is a higher chance that one party can win an absolute majority, and an absolute
majority is a virtual certainty in two-party systems. Several studies indicate that the number of
effective parties in a given system is strongly and positively correlated with the number of
representatives elected from each electoral district, known as district magnitude (Duveger
1954, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993). Electoral systems with low district magnitudes
distribute seats less proportionally than those with large district magnitudes, and lower
proportionality usually favours larger parties. Other factors that affect proportionality include
12
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legislative seats, the method used to apportion seats, and whether or not a second allocation of
seats is used to reduce disparities at the district level. Plurality systems, which elect only one
representative per district, encourage a two-party system, and they are consequently most likely
to have one-party majority governments. Proportional representation  (PR) systems have more
variation in their district magnitudes, though the magnitudes are always larger than those found
in plurality systems. They tend to have more parties in parliament and are characterised by
multiparty majority or either one-party or multi-party minority governments.
Table 1 compares the electoral systems and government structures in EU member states. The
first column describes some key characteristics of the electoral system, and column two the
preferences and the competitiveness of the government formation stage for period 1980 to
2000. The first indicator is the average number of parties in government. The figures show that
there is a strong, but not perfect, correlation between the district magnitude and the number of
parties a suggested by the theory. Plurality systems and proportional systems with a district
magnitude of less than ten representatives tend to lead to one-party governments. Above that
the relationship is more tenuous for European countries and possibly other factors, such as the
traditional party structure or the main political cleavages in the party system becomes more
important.  The maximum average number of parties in government in our sample has Belgium
with 4.5 and Italy (before 1996) with 4.2.
Our second indicator, the change in coalition of ruling parties as a share of the total number of
new governments, is an indicator of the competitiveness of the electoral and government
formation process. There are different reasons for the termination of governments, the electoral
turn being the most important one, but the government formation process may not be very
competitive since there are clearly established party blocks and parties continue in power for
decades. Conversely, coalition governments may frequently reshuffle and the government
formation process may be relatively uncertain ex-ante. The figures show that there is not a
perfect relationship between the number of parties in government and the competitiveness of
the government formation process. For example, Belgium has a large number of parties in
government and a relatively competitive process. By comparison, governing coalitions in Italy
are large, but also fairly stable during the 1980s to the mid-1990s. In Ireland, there is a small
number of parties in government, but those change rather frequently after the end of a term or
the breakdown of a coalition. The fifth and sixth columns then show the ideological range of a
governing coalition. These and the previous indicators are taken from Tsebelis’ dataset on veto
13
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December 2004players.8 The first ideological indicator captures the classical left-right dimension, and the
second one adds another policy that depends on the prevailing party divide in each country.
Graph 1 shows that there is clearly a positive relationship between the number of parties in
government and the ideological dispersion of governing parties. Thus one can expect the
principal agent problem associated with a delegation regime in fact to be larger in countries
like Belgium and Finland, with ideologically diverse ruling coalitions.
The final column then indicates the predicted form of fiscal governance based on these
characteristics and the prevalence of minority governments in member states. In general, the
classification is relatively clear if one assumes a threshold of around 2 parties in the governing
coalition of average, which implies that there is generally a proper coalition government, and a
Ireland, and Italy (before 1996) would clearly belong to the group of countries where one
would expect a contract approach. Conversely, Greece Portugal, Spain and the UK are among
the countries where a dominance approach could be feasible. Borderline cases are probably
Austria, Germany, France and Luxembourg. A difference among these countries is that
Austria, Germany and France were marked by a party blocks, during large parts of the 1980s
and 1990s, where it was clear before the election which party coalition would form even if
other options would have been possible. This seems to have been less the case for
Luxembourg, where the dominant Christian Socialist Party alternated coalitions with the
Socialist Workers Party or the Democratic Party. The coalition was formed with the party that
held more seats even though the previous constellation could have been continued without
loosing majority in parliament. Possibly this pattern can be explained by the small ideological
diversity of parties in Luxembourg, where the representation of local interest seems to play a
larger role than in other countries (Dumont and De Winter 2000). Therefore, one could expect
a contract regime since the smaller party may want to ensure that its agenda is pursued when
the next election is approaching. Finally, there are two countries – Denmark and Sweden –
where, with short interruptions,9 minority governments always prevailed. While the Social
Democrats often formed one-party governments in Sweden, they usually took small coalitions
partners into government in Denmark. However, there may not have been a strong distinction
between small parties in and out of government, giving it its support when needed, since the
coalition partners changed frequently.
                                                     
8  The dataset is made available on his webpage (http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/).
9  The interruptions were from January 1993 to September 1994 in Denmark and from January 1980 to May 1981
in the Swedish case.
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December 2004IV. Fiscal Rules and the Structure of Budgetary Processes
Having spelled out our analytical framework, and the relevant characteristics of the
government system, we now have to operationalise and describe budgetary institutions in
Europe. The theoretical approach distinguishes a contract and a delegation approach to
budgeting. The institutional correlate of these two approaches is the structure of fiscal rules and
the budget process. Fiscal rules should be understood here as any behavioural or legal norm
guiding budgetary decision-making and implementation. As such it can take different forms
leading from political declarations, over multi-annual budget plans to legal budgetary
regulations. The structure of the budget process is mainly characterised by the degree of
fractionalisation of decision-making. However, it should be recalled that the institutional
requirements to centralize decision-making and channelling the budget through the process
without allowing for extensive changes are not identical for the two approaches.
In order to capture these two dimensions, von Hagen (1992) investigates different institutional
aspects of the budgetary process: the structure of negotiations within government, the structure
of the parliamentary process, the flexibility of budget execution, and the stringency of long-
term planning constraints. We follow his approach. The relevant items constituting each
institutional aspect are presented in Table 2. Fiscal rules and targets are more stringent, the
more encompassing the budget category or aggregate for which a multi-annual target is set, the
longer the forecast horizon, the more elaborate the forecast on which they built and the higher
the degree of political commitment attached to them.
The budget negotiations are the more centralised, the more general the budgetary constraint set
at the beginning of the budgetary negotiations, the more power given to the minister of finance
in the budgetary, the broader the scope of the budget norms the minister can set for budget
negotiations, and the more centralised the structure of negotiations.  The budget negotiations in
parliament are the more constrained the less scope is given to amendments, the higher the costs
of a failure to pass the budget imposing discipline on legislators, and the less room for log-
rolling is given by the voting procedure. The degree of flexibility or control during the budget
execution is determined by the authority of the minister of finance to block expenditures, the
existence of cash limits, the need for an disbursement approval from the minister of finance or
a controller, the scope of budgetary transfers, the institutional barriers to changes of the budget
law during the implementation phase and the strictness of carry-over regulations.
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The data on fiscal institutions in EU member states are mainly based on two expert surveys
conducted in 1992 and 2001.10 They were complemented by documentary analysis and in depth
interviews. For the sake of comparability across time and countries, we operationalise
institutional items and code fiscal rules according to their stringency and budgetary processes
according to the degree of centralisation or control they entail. Each institutional code i is
normalised to  ] 4 , 0 [ ∈ i .11 Countries are then grouped by the form of fiscal governance, which
we would expect according to its government system as discussed in Section III and presented
actual pattern and development of budgetary institutions corresponds to our predictions.
Table 3 displays the rules in place concerning long-term constraints, and indeed the reported
changes over the past ten years have been fairly dramatic for two items. EU member states now
uniformly report the usage of targets, while the usage of multi-annual targets varied largely in
the early 1990s, and has been particularly weak in mixed governance structures and strongest
for contract states. Moreover, large improvements apparently occurred regarding the nature of
the plan. While a lot of plans were based on ad-hoc assumptions they are now more often
reported to be based on a consistent macro-economic framework. Beyond this, the degree of
commitment has improved in selective countries, but above all in the two states where a mixed
governance structure would be appropriate. Therefore the level of commitment in ‘mixed’
states seems to be equivalent to those where a contract system would be suitable. In line with
our predictions, the existing rules in delegation states are less stringent than those in contract
states in 2001, and the overall institutional reform has been somewhat less pronounced.
Table 4 presents the average scores for different institutions structuring the governmental
planning stage according to the predicted form of fiscal governance.  The table shows that
overall budgetary negotiations are more centralised now than they were in the early 1990s. The
general constraint and the type of norm given out for budgetary requests tightened across the
board. Other institutions have developed more selectively. In particular, the agenda-setting
power of the minister of finance and the structure of cabinet negotiations provides the minister
of finance with more authority now. These reforms have above all transformed the fragmented
structures in Greece, Italy and Spain towards a delegation model, as our theoretical framework
would have predicted. To a lesser extent they have also helped to overcome the institutional
weakness in some contract states, such as Belgium and Ireland.
                                                     
10  In between a survey was conducted by de Haan et al. (1999)
11  For the coding scheme see von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg et al. (2003)
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December 2004Table 5 indicates that overall there has been some strengthening of the government vis-à-vis
parliament. Changes have been particularly strong in delegation states, where it may be much
easier now for the minister of finance to channel budgetary proposals through parliament than
before. The most notable change concerned offsetting amendments - a majority of states
introduced this requirement. Additional restraints on amendments have tightened the budgetary
process in Germany, Greece and Italy, i.e. delegation states. Institutional changes are equally
apparent, but somewhat more balanced across types of government when examining the global
vote on the total budget—eight states introduced this requirement after 1991. This group of
countries comprises delegation states and all states where we would predict mixed types of
governance. Overall, countries with rather fragmented parliamentary institutions, such as
Greece, Germany, Italy and Sweden have introduced major changes to centralise the process.
As Table 6 shows, there has been less change at the implementation stage of the budget process
than at other stages. However, some patterns emerge. The right to block expenditures has been
mainly strengthened among states where a mixed governance structure is appropriate. Cash
limits and disbursement approval have gained more prevalence in delegation states.
Regulations on transfers have been reported for six countries. But those were distributed evenly
across the different types of governance. Carry-over regulations seem to be tighter in two
delegation states – Germany and Spain – now than a decade ago. Almost surprisingly,
regulations on budgetary changes apparently are less stringent in several EU member states
now, with seven of fifteen allowing changes mid-year that did not allow them before.
Regarding cross sectional performance, most institutional changes are again reported for Italy,
but there is no clear pattern apparent beyond that.
The main development that can be detected for EU member states is that several countries,
which previously had rather fragmented budgetary processes, now have more centralised
institutional settings reflecting a delegation approach. This is the direction of institutional
reform that our analytical framework would predict based upon the forms of government in
these countries. By 2001, countries where we would have predicted a delegation approach have
less stringent fiscal rules and targets, more centralized budget negotiations during the planning
stage and a more restrictive amendment and voting process in parliament. This reflects the
functionality of different institutions in accordance with our theoretical scheme.
VI. The Impact of Fiscal Forms of Governance and Fiscal Rules on Public Debt
Having shown that institutional settings in countries follow different patterns, we now
investigate whether these institutions also differ in their impact. To analyse the impact of
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used in several other studies (see e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, de Haan and Sturm 1994,
Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999):
t t i t i t i t i t i t i I S P X debt debt ε β β β β β α + + + + + ∆ + = ∆ − , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 1 , , (1)
The dependent variable is the change in the gross debt burden as share of GDP for country i at
time  t. Macro-economic variables are included in matrix X={real GDP growth, change in
unemployment rate, debt service costs}. The matrix P comprises two political controls,
P={election year, veto}. The veto variable is taken from Tsebelis’ concept of veto-players and
captures the ideological complexion of government. It measures the maximum ideological
distance among government parties based on ideological scores along an economic, left-right
dimensions (see Table 1 for further explanation). It has been argued that coalition governments
should find it more difficult to agree on consolidation efforts (see Spolaore 1993). The simple
idea is that coalitions find it more difficult to agree, if they are not ideologically closely
aligned. This aspect has not been fully captured by previous studies, which include often the
numbers of parties in government as neglect ideological positions.
The matrix S={population, openness, output volatility} comprises some structural
for the size of the economy. Generally the size of a country can affect the economies of scale in
the production of public services. Larger populations may therefore be associated with lower
spending, and possibly deficit levels. More importantly in our context, however, is the political
weight of large countries in European decision-making processes. Big countries have more
leverage in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. People in large countries may
therefore care less about the supra-national level and the loss of reputation for breaching
European rules may be less. This would reduce the disciplining impact. Openness is related to
the exposure of economic sectors to external competitiveness. Small, open economies tend to
built more corporatist governance structures (Katzenstein 1985) which could lead to a stronger
deficit bias. Output volatility is obviously related to the openness of the economy. However, it
should capture more generally the demand for fiscal insurance (see also Rodrik 1998). Since
insurance may be provided the automatic stabilisation of disposable income, there is no
obvious deficit bias over the cycle. This could nevertheless lead to a deficit bias if the policy
reaction to economic fluctuations is asymmetric, or tax and benefit systems lead to a ratcheting
up of unemployment rates.
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December 2004The matrix I represents the institutional variables consisting of an indicator for borrowing
restrictions for sub-national governments, a fiscal convergence indicator for Stage II of EMU, a
centralisation and a rules index. The first institutional variable captures is operationalized as a
dummy variable, which captures whether regional or local governments are restricted by law or
the control of the central government for borrowing.12 The convergence indicator is the
distance to the 3% deficit to GDP reference value, capturing the adjustment need for those
countries with larger deficits between 1992 and 1997.
The institutional variables I deserve some explanation. We have shown that budgetary
institutions are not used equally across states and that government systems tend to follow
certain patterns. Therefore, budgetary institutions obviously interact and their composition is
not random. Institutions constituting long-term constraints are indeed highly correlated. This
holds partially as well for the structure of budgetary negotiations and amendment rules in
parliament and other procedural aspects. Therefore we prefer to construct an aggregate index of
centralisation and strictness instead of including all institutions individually. The index values
used in levels in the regression exercise. Since budgetary institutions did not change in the mid
to late 1980s (see von Hagen 1992), this allows us to base our analysis of budgetary effects on
a sample starting in 1985 and ending in 2001. The data when budgetary institutions were
reformed are known for Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden where the most significant
changes occurred (see Hallerberg 2004). For the remaining countries the dates of institutional
reforms are not always known. In those cases we assume that changes became effective in
1998, since this is the time period covered by Hallerberg et al. (2001). However, this
measurement error problem will be taken into account for the empirical analysis by excluding
Stage II of EMU for those countries with incomplete information on the timing.
The coefficients are estimated as OLS. The computation of standard errors allows disturbances
to be group-wise heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across countries. Our
model in its extended form includes a number of control variables, some of them showing
considerably more between than within-country variation, in order to exclude an omitted
variables bias. Therefore we see no reason to estimate the model using fixed or random effects,
which is often done to control for these omitted factors. Estimating a random or fixed effects
model would moreover lead to the additional complications. First, institutional variables
unfortunately show little variation over time. Introducing country effects could therefore lead
                                                     
12 The information is taken from Eichengreen and von Hagen (1995) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). Unfortunately
data restrictions did not allow to compute the distribution of taxes among different layers of government,
which had been suggested as a measure of fiscal decentralisation in some comments. We would like to thank
Gerhard Schwab for the data screening.
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right hand side. Consistently estimating common coefficients in a dynamic panel with country
effects requires an IV or GMM approach. The Anderson-Hsiao (1982) approach would be the
most appropriate for our data set with a relatively small time and cross-sectional dimension. To
estimate consistent common coefficients, the approach eliminates country effects through
differencing and yields the above model in first differences without a constant and an
instrument of the endogenous variable. Estimating the transformed model may however be
associated with significant efficiency losses.
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 7. First, the baseline model including
economic controls and political factors explains 60% of the variance. This is quite satisfactory.
A number of macroeconomic variables have the expected positive or negative effect on
changes in public debt, which is confirming for the quality of the model. Real GDP growth has
a negative impact, while changes in unemployment produce a strong rise in public debt.
Furthermore, we find empirical evidence for an electoral cycle. Adding the structural factors to
this model does not lead to any additional explanatory power. All three structural variables –
population, openness and volatility – remain insignificant. When the set of institutional
variables is added, the overall explanatory power of the model increases slightly. The
centralisation index and the fiscal rules index both carry a negative coefficient, which are
statistically significant at a 5% level.
Although both indices turn out to be statistically significant, it is not clear whether this holds
for all groups of countries in the same manner, since fiscal targets are integral part of the
contract approach, whereas the centralisation of decision-making seems more important for the
delegation approach. We will analyse this aspect in turn and Table 8 contains the estimates.
The estimates for the macroeconomic and political variables are reported since they reveal
some interesting differences with regard to the political and institutional factors. First, the
overall explanatory power of the model increases for contract and delegation states compared
to the sample including all countries. Institutional variables add 5% of explained variance for
contract states and 14% for delegation states. Second, political business cycles seem to be more
important for delegation states. This is an intuitive result compatible with von Hagen (1998)
and Clark and Hallerberg (2000) since large coalition governments in competitive party
systems may be bound by the fiscal contract and may find it much more difficult to agree on a
deficit increase since it may not benefit all parties equally. By comparison, a one-party
government will have a larger benefit from a pre-electoral budgetary expansion. Third, we
moreover find opposite effects for fiscal restraints on lower levels of government. While they
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coefficient on delegation states. It is not fully clear what produces the latter. The endogeneity
of the institutional constraint or its lack of credibility due to the existence of a bailout
provision, as for example in Germany, may provide possible explanations. Finally, we findf
moreover a positive effect of the centralisation of the budgetary process on changes in public
debt for contract states, which is however only statistically significant at the 10% level.
Moreover, it is not robust to the specification of the model, as will be shown later and vanishes
if either Belgium or the Netherlands is dropped from the sample. By contrast the rules index is
associated with a highly significant negative effect. The opposite holds for the group of non-
contract states. As shown in the second column, the centralisation of the budget process
appears to be the main disciplining device in this group of countries. This finding, however, is
based on the performance of mixed countries. Replicating the exercise for the sub-sample of
delegation states yields negative and statistically significant coefficients for the centralisation
and stringency indices.
The lack of significance of fiscal targets may seem somewhat surprising given the
characterisation of the mixed form of governance presented in Section 4 and 5. However, it
should be noted that these countries do not operate under a multi-annual contract system as
others. Fiscal targets in Denmark are yearly and there is no effective multi-annual budgeting.
Similarly, in Sweden, the government renegotiates the three-year targets with opposition
parties each year. While the government sticks closely to the expenditure targets during budget
execution, they are subject to revision each budgetary year. These systems differ from the
multi-annual contracts existing in other countries. In addition, the budgetary volatility in these
countries inflates the variance of the estimate and propels against a more clear cut pattern.
The finding that the stringency of fiscal rules is a relevant factor, not only in contract but also
in delegation states, contradicts somewhat von Hagen’s (1992) earlier analysis, where no
evidence for a significant impact of long-term constraints could be found. At the time, a
multiannual framework effectively did not exist in a number of countries. The impact apparent
in our estimates could thus capture mainly the implementation of such a system. Alternatively,
it could be argued that more stringent rules are more effective because the help to tie in parts of
the general government, which are not directly controlled by the budget process, such as social
security funds. Finally, one would expect the stringency to be important, even theoretically, if
it is backed by the power of the minister of finance. This would presume that there is a
complementary relationship between these two institutions.
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 419
December 2004We consider the issue of interaction between centralisation of decision-making processes and
stringency of budgetary targets by using different combinations of indices. A multiplicative
interaction reflects the complementary relation, while an additive aggregation implies a
substitutive relation. Again we distinguish between contract and non-contract states. Due to the
collinearity between individual indices and interactive terms it is not possible to include both in
the model and thus make conditional statements. The empirical results are somewhat
inconclusive since they do not allow us to distinguish which functional form may be more
appropriate (see Table 9). The coefficients of the multiplicative and the additive interactive
terms are negative but insignificant at standard levels for contract states, while both are
statistically significant for non-contract states. The latter result carries through to delegation
states. The conclusion which can be drawn is that the centralisation of budgetary procedures
indeed seems not to matter for contract states, while the interaction is relevant in other
countries, but it remains an open issue whether the institutional relationship is indeed
complementary or not.
VII. Robustness Checks
There may be various objections to the above exercise. A first one could question the validity
of the above specification to estimate equation (1) due to the potential endogeneity of
contemporaneous macro-variables. Contemporaneous output growth and the unemployment
rate or the prevailing interest rate may be affected by fiscal shocks. Controlling for this factor
would require to instrumentalise these variables. We do so using lagged values and the
contemporaneous US figures of the growth rate, the change in the unemployment rate and real
long-term interest rate. It is notoriously difficult to instrument changes and the quality of our
instruments unfortunately remains fairly poor.13 This caveat has to be kept in mind when
interpreting the results presented in Table 10. For the sake of brevity, we report coefficients for
institutional variables only. A first consequence is that the overall predictive power of the
model decreases since it explains only half of the variance when applied to all countries. The
sign and the significance of coefficients nevertheless does not change for the main macro
variables. With respect to the institutional indices, the negative coefficients for the rules and
the centralisation index remain statistically significant at standard levels. However, when
looking at subgroups of countries, we see that this effect becomes weaker for contract states
while both institutional variables maintain a negative highly significant coefficient for
                                                     
13  The first stage regressions achieved an adj_R_square of around 0.4 for output growth and the change in the
unemployment rate and 0.54 for the debt servicing costs.
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finding since even the impact of macro-variables vanishes for this specification.
Further objections may be raised regarding the validity of our institutional measures. The
change in budgetary institutions may have been an endogenous component of the fiscal
adjustment strategies required to comply with the Maastricht criteria.14 If this were the case, the
above estimates would be biased. To control for that factor, we instrumentalise the change in
the centralisation and rules index using the institutional setting and the debt level in 1991.
Table 11 provides the results of these exercises.  The coefficient of the rules index in contract
states remains negative but loses explanatory power for all countries, but it remains highly
significant impact for the group of non-contract states. The results for delegation states are
however fully robust. The negative coefficient for the centralisation and stringency indices
remain statistically highly significant. Thus, the previous results are clearly confirmed.
VIII. Summary
In the present study we have updated and extended previous research on budgetary processes in
European countries. Using a new data set we have described the current structure of budgetary
processes and the development of a selected set of institutions over the last ten years. The main
finding is that overall budgetary processes are more centralised now than they were in the early
1990s, when several countries still showed rather fragmented decision-making structures
giving rise to a budgetary co-ordination problem. By comparison, spending and deficit biases
should be less prevailing in budgetary decision-making now than they were a decade ago in
several highly indebted countries. Second, institutional reforms are in line with our functional
considerations relating the structure of government to the type of fiscal governance. Thus, the
overall current pattern of budgetary institutions confirms that countries with predominantly
coalition governments employ the contract approach while electoral systems leading regularly
to majority government and persistent party constellations in government tend to follow a
delegation approach of institutional centralisation to overcome the fiscal co-ordination
                                                     
14 An important question to consider is why countries change their budget institutions. The answer is beyond the
scope of this paper, but there is work that considers this question. In a book-length treatment that traces
changes in budget institutions in the EU-15, Hallerberg (2004) contends that two preconditions are needed for
the appropriate institutions to be put in place. First, the party system must be competitive so that voters can
punish incumbents who do not maintain fiscal discipline. Second, the party system must be stable so that
budget rules have time to become institutionalized.  Hallerberg (2004) concludes that Maastricht may have
helped focus decision-makers on maintaining fiscal discipline in some countries like Belgium and Italy, but it
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December 2004problem. A mixed approach tends to emerge in states with minority governments. These
institutional developments can be understood as instances of institutional choice yielding a
functional form of governance. Our analysis thus links constitutional regulations – such as
electoral rules producing specific forms of governance – to more detailed decision-making
structures.15
The budgetary impact of these fiscal rules and forms of governance has been the main topic of
the last section. We found that the impact of centralisation of budgetary decision-making
actually varies with the form of fiscal governance. It contributes less to fiscal sustainability for
the contract approach, where the stringency of multiannual targets seems to be more important.
For delegation states, the centralisation of the budget process as well as more stringent
budgetary targets seem to operate as disciplining devices. Various reasons can drive this result.
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of multiannual targets should be contingent on
being backed by a strong minister of finance. Unfortunately, the empirical results do not allow
us to determine the functional relation between these two sets of institutions. They may be
either substitutes or complements.
                                                     
15  It thereby contributes to a field of research which Persson and Tabellini (2002) have recently identified as
major topic of future studies.
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December 2004Table 2: Institutional Items
Budgetary Process
Budget Formulation Budget Approval Budget Implementation
-  general constraint
-  agenda setting of minister
of finance
-  budget norms (broad or for
specific spending items)
-  structure of negotiations in
cabinet
-  amendment limitations
-  amendment off-setting
-  budget amendment can lead
to  fall of government
-  all expenditures passed in
one vote
-  global vote on budget (vote
on total size of budget)
-  minister of finance can
block expenditures
-  cash limits
-  constraints on transfer
allowance
-  changes in budget law
-  disbursement approval
-  carry-over regulations
Multi-annual Targets




-  nature of plan (quality and
regularity of planning
exercise)
-  degree of commitment
(legal, political or
indicative)




Horizon Nature of Plan Degree of
Commitment Sum Long-Term
 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
delegation 1.1* 4.0 2.7 2.4** 1.9 4.0 2.0 2.8* 7.7 13.1*
contract 2.7 4.0 2.3 3.2 1.3 3.6 2.2 3.4 8.5 14.2
mixed 1.0 4.0 1.0 2.5 1.5 4.0 1.0 3.0 4.5 13.5
overall
average 1.7 4.0 2.3 2.7 1.6 3.9 1.9 3.0 7.6 13.5
Note: Data are from Von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001).
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Country
General





1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
delegation 1.7 3.5 2.1 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.6 3.3*** 9.1 14.0**
contract 1.5 3.6 2.0 2.8 1.6 4.0 1.3 1.6 6.4 12.0
mixed 2.0 3.5 1.5 3.5 1.3 4.0 4.0 3.0 8.8 14.0
overall
average 1.7 3.5 2 3.1 2 4 2.3 2.7 8.0 13.3
Note: Data are from von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001). Statistical significance levels for
one-tailed test. “Budget norms” indicate whether they are narrow and consider only the deficit (low score) or whether
they are broad (high score).















 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
delegation 1.7 1.5 0.6 3.0*** 2.3 3.0 1.3 3.5** 1.4 1.5 7.3 12.5
contract 2.7 1.6 0.0 0.8 3.3 4.0 0.7 1.6 1.3 2.0 8.0 10.0
mixed 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4 4 12 12.0
overall
average 1.9 1.3 0.5 2.1 2.9 3.2 1.1 2.9 1.7 2 8.2 11.6
Note: Data are from von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001). Statistical significance levels for
one-tailed test. Amendments cause fall is coded as zero if a parliamentary amendment to the budget cannot cause a fall
in government and coded as four if an amendment can lead to the collapse of the government.









 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
delega-
tion 2.3* 3.5 3.4*** 4.0*** 2.0 2.5 1.3 1.36 3.0 0.8 1.8 1.5 14.1** 13.6
commitm
ent 0.7 2.4 0.0 0.8 2.3 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.2 1.6 2.0 2.1 8.5 10.6
mixed 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 3.5 0.7 1.3 7.6 10.8
overall
average 1.3 2.9 1.9 2.67 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.7 2.8 1.4 1.73 1.7 11.0 12.2
Note: Data are from von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001).
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 419


































































R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.62
Wald Statistic 189.07*** 210.69*** 294.01***
Nobs 208 208 208
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level.
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Variables Country groups























































































R-squared 0.75 0.61 0.68
Wald Statistic 276.88*** 410.93*** 1015.71***
Nobs 89 119 90
Note:The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level.
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R_squared 0.72 0.61 0.67 0.72 0.61 0.64
Wald Test 227.98*** 342.68*** 743.24 237.71*** 325.92*** 859.32***
Nobs 89 119 90 89 119 90
sample:
country group contract non-contract delegation contract non-contract delegation
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent
level.


















R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.65
Wald Statistic 188.73*** 139.42*** 296.80 546.17
Nobs 205 89 116 87
Country: all contract non-contract delegation
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level.


















R_squared 0.62 0.73 0.61 0.65
Wald Test 310.05*** 304.91 465.80*** 859.85
Nobs 208 89 119 90
sample:
country group all contract non-contract delegation
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